Russia and Syria: Arms, Basing Rights, and Continuity

[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 26 March 2009.]

In September 2008, then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney was unhappy with Russia and Syria. "Russian arms-dealing has endangered the prospects for peace and freedom in [the Middle East],” Cheney told reporters at a political-economic summit in Cernobbio, Italy. Cheney fingered Russia as a primary source of weapons that are eventually funneled by Syria and Iran to Hizballah, and then continued, “This chain of aggressive moves and diplomatic reversals has only intensified the concern that many have about Russia's larger objectives.” (1)

Although he was not specific, Cheney was likely provoked by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s late-August weapons-shopping trip to the Russian presidential residence in Sochi, where he met with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Dmitri Medvedev. As it does with Iran, Russia maintained that it would sell to Damascus only defensive weapons. (2)

However, for Syria, the ensuing six months have culminated in vastly different rhetoric from the new administration in Washington. With the expressed intent of isolating Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this month sent her acting assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and National Security Council official Daniel Shapiro to Damascus to hold talks with high-level Syrian government representatives. For her part, Clinton spoke briefly with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam on the sidelines of a conference in Egypt on March 2, and met Lavrov in Switzerland on March 5. Even Syria’s most bitter antagonists in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are softening their approach, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal declaring a few weeks ago, “We have dug a deep pit and buried our differences and will not return to past disputes but will look forward to the future.” (3)

In light of the present bounty of guarded optimism from Syria’s past adversaries, Russia has had little to say. It quietly maintains the patron-client relationship it has held with Syria, off and on, since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1980. Although the relationship deteriorated during the Gorbachev era as Russia normalized relations with Israel, Russia and Syria have steadily resumed cooperation in the intervening years.

As is the case with Iran, Russia appears to be the most important, but not the only, supplier of weapons to Syria; however, while Iran has purchased hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Russian military technology, Syria’s purchases are much more meager and are likely based on credit. (4) Another option is for Syria to compensate Russia with naval basing rights. In late January 2009, a flurry of reports emanated from Russian news agencies, claiming that Russia would set up a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus; in the following days, a Russian naval spokesman disputed the reports, saying that they were inaccurate and did not represent an “official position.” (5) Finally, a month later, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council Upper House of Parliament, Sergei Mironov, seemed to give the bases a green light, stating that Russia must protect “its national interests not only along the perimeter of its borders, but … those parts of the world where it considers important and necessary to do that. … The experience shows that the … ocean will remain the place where the interests of different states will clash. … Thus the appearance of maybe not bases but friendly ports.” (6)

Outside the military realm, Russia has been assisting Syria with its energy infrastructure. Last month, Tatneft announced the discovery of “significant” oil reserves in Syria’s eastern desert, which should help to assuage Syria’s falling oil-production volume. (7) Additionally, several Russian energy firms --- including Tatneft, NOVATEK and Stroitransgas --- are working on developing Syria’s gas natural production capabilities. On February 12, Stroitransgas announced that, over the next two years, it would account for more than half of the expected increase in Syria’s gas output, which the company expects to rise to 24 million cubic meters per day. However, considering that Syrian domestic gas need is expected to rise to 30 million cubic meters per day in the same time frame, these projects as yet do not appear to be large-scale moneymakers. (8)

Given that Syria seems to be a charity case, commentators have speculated on the intangible benefits Russia may gain from the two countries’ relationship. In an ISCIP Perspective from May 2008, U.S. Army War College Professor Stephen Blank writes, “Russian officials apparently believe that being Syria’s patron demonstrates Moscow’s relevance to the Middle East as an indispensable great power and confirms its possession of levers that could advance the peace process along with Russian political, economic, and strategic interests in the region.” However Russia may perceive the results of its relationship with Syria, in avoiding overly enthusiastic rhetoric regarding the relationship, Russia has indeed changed the way it is perceived. For example, senior Israeli government officials told the Jerusalem Post that they would prefer Russia, and not France, to host the next Middle East peace conference. "The French are trying to do everything to paint a moderate portrait of Assad … [and] creating an illusion of Syria, as if they are not reading the papers or intelligence documents," the officials said. (9)

While France’s approach to Syria may reflect on Russia as the more realistic player, the French-Syrian relationship may also threaten to reduce Russia’s role in Syria to that of simply a weapons merchant. Barring a lasting peace between Syria and Israel, it is impossible to envision any Western nation exporting arms to Syria, but French public and private enterprises would be able to fulfill virtually any other role currently fulfilled by Russia. In September 2008, France and Syria signed several agreements guaranteeing French assistance in the development of Syria’s oil, gas and transportation infrastructure. (10)

Yet, if Syria demonstrates obstructionist tendencies in the U.S.-Iran or Israel-Palestine dialogues, or if Syria accelerates its cooperation with Hizballah, it is difficult to envision France deepening its relationship with Syria, but easy to envision France withdrawing. Therefore, what is most likely to contribute to a continuation of Russia’s current relationship with Syria may be what is least beneficial for Syria and everyone else.

(1) “Cheney: Russian arms reaching Hizbullah,” YnetNews, 06 Sept 08 via http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3592868,00.html.
(2) “Assad's shopping list,” The Jerusalem Post, 21 Aug 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “King Abdullah calls minisummit,” Arab News, 11 March 09 via http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=120159&d=11&m=3&y=2009.
(4) “Russia’s Mid-East Role,” ISCIP Perspective, 01 May 08.
(5) “Russia Said Eyeing Socotra for Basing Facility,” Vedomosti, 22 Jan 09; “Russia not planning to set up naval bases in Syria, Libya, Yemen: Navy spokesman,” Interfax, 19 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(6) “Russia must protect its interests not only along borders – speaker,” ITAR-TASS, 25 Feb 09 via Dow Jones Factiva.
(7) “Russia's Tatneft makes 'significant' Syrian oil find,” Platts Oilgram News, 4 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(8) “Stroitransgas Plans Syria Gas Output Boost,” NEFTE Compass, 12 Feb 09 via Dow Jones Factiva.
(9) “Russia may finally get its ME summit,” The Jerusalem Post, 13 Feb 09 via http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304770149&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter.
(10) “Syria, France sign agreements on oil, gas, transport cooperation,” SANA News Agency, 6 Sept 08 via BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)