Russia and Turkey: Relations between Equals?

[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 05 March 2009.]

Prime Minister Erdogan: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I don't think I will come back to Davos after this. (1)

Who could have predicted that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan would end up stealing the show at the Davos World Economic Forum, particularly in such a fashion? At the conclusion of a Jan. 29 panel including Erdogan, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Israeli President Shimon Peres, Erdogan took control of the floor despite objections from the moderator, denounced what he felt was an inappropriate 25-minute filibuster by Peres, and stalked off the stage. The topic, of course, had been Israel’s recently concluded siege of the Gaza Strip, which Erdogan denounced as barbaric (to be fair, he later denounced anti-Semitism as a “crime against humanity”). (2)

International media outlets seized on the episode and issued a deluge of editorials in which Erdogan’s Davos tirade represents a crucial juncture in Turkish foreign policy. Despite the flag-waving crowd of apparent patriots who welcomed Erdogan home after his premature departure from Davos, opinion in the Turkish press was not unanimous. An Istanbul-based writer for the International Herald Tribune wrote that Erdogan’s outburst signaled a “neo-Ottoman awakening,” and concluded that “some things are changing in Turkey … for good.” (3) On the other hand, a columnist for Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News cautioned that “neither Israel nor Turkey could run the risk” of “spoil[ing] their relationship.” (4)

Similar warnings appeared in Israeli and U.S. media. An unnamed Israeli official told Haaretz, "One does not risk the foreign policy of a country that claims to be a regional power for the sake of local elections," attributing Erdogan’s motivations to simple electioneering for the sake of Turkey’s upcoming electoral contests. (5) And in one of the most recent and high-profile editorials from the United States, David L. Phillips, director of the Turkey Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States, shifted the focus from Erdogan to Turkey itself, scolding: “Turkey must repair its ties with Israel. … Turkey’s future lies with the West. The Islamist street leads away from Europe to the Middle East.” (6)

And this is where Russia comes in. The opportunities provided by Turkish-Russian cooperation prove that Turkey’s choice is not binary; Turkey need not choose between either the West (i.e., the United States and Western Europe) or the Middle East. Because of its strategic location and unique cultural history, Turkey’s options are much more varied than Phillips portrays them. By cooperating with Russia and thus evading the West-versus-Middle East paradigm, Turkey opens up avenues to commerce, development and diplomacy that may never have existed had it relied only upon the West.

It is coincidental, but also providential, that Erdogan’s Davos performance would be followed so closely by Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s Feb. 12-15 official state visit to Moscow, the first of its kind by a Turkish president. Gul was enthusiastic at a joint press conference: “Our relations have already reached the level of multidimensional positive partnership on a whole range of subjects. … Russia and Turkey are the two most important countries in the region, which are called upon to make a weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, security and cooperation.” (7)

President Medvedev’s commentary was similar, but included an interesting phrase: “And these are at the moment not simply relations between equals, but are also very friendly and have very good prospects. We have recently started to call them multifaceted cooperation and multidimensional partnership.” (8)

“Not simply relations between equals.” Whatever Medvedev meant to say, there’s no disputing that right now, Turkey and Russia are not equal. One need look no further than the countries’ respective trade volumes to see that. During the state visit Medvedev pointed out that the Russia-Turkey trade volume has reached approximately $34 billion, (9) a giant leap from only $1 billion a decade ago; perhaps not wishing to embarrass his guest, Medvedev didn’t mention that this total disproportionately favors Russian exports to Turkey, which reached approximately $28.26 billion in 2008. (10) Speaking about the trade volume, Gul alluded only to “problems that exist in this area,” but then went on to express his hope that the volume will “very soon” reach $40 billion to $50 billion. (11)

Any increase in trade volume will be due in part to Russia’s accelerating participation in the development of Turkey’s energy infrastructure. During Gul’s visit, the two countries signed an agreement for Russia to supply Turkey with $60 billion of electricity over the next 15 years. (12) Additionally, Russia’s Atomstroyexport leads the only consortium to submit a bid to construct and operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, which would be located in the Mediterranean province of Mersin and have an operating capacity of 4,800 megawatts. (13) Likely because it was the sole bidder, the consortium initially tendered an offer for the plant to produce electricity at the exorbitant price of 21.16 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to the international average of 10 to 15 cents per kilowatt hour. (14) However, coinciding with Gul’s visit, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced, “We gave Turkey a good discount,” which a representative of the Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. confirmed to be a 30% reduction to 15.35 cents per kilowatt hour. (15) Shmatko also mentioned that Turkey may sign an agreement to have Russia construct four other nuclear plants of 1,200 megawatts each, and he estimated that the cost of the contract could be $18 billion to $20 billion. (16)

Turkish money has also been flowing into Muslim-majority Tatarstan, where Turkey accounts for 70% of all foreign investment. (17) The first Turkish president ever to visit the republic, Gul signed agreements for Turkish future investment worth $250 million. (18)

While Gul’s visit seems unlikely to lead to any significant recalibration of the lopsided economic relationship between the two countries, the countries are on more equal footing when it comes to regional diplomacy. Gul and Medvedev signed a declaration in which Russia praised Turkey’s proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) as a “constructive initiative which complements the existing international mechanisms and which will help eliminate the lack of trust between the countries involved in frozen conflicts.” (19)

The significance of this statement is twofold. First, Russia’s recognition of Turkey’s dominant role vis-à-vis the CSCP seems to dismiss any lingering suggestions of ill will between the countries regarding Turkey’s behavior during the 2008 South Ossetia conflict, as a direct result of which Turkey initially proposed the CSCP. There had been allegations that Russia was displeased with Turkey’s allowing U.S. warships bearing humanitarian aid into the Black Sea during the conflict. (20) Second, Russia is acknowledging Turkey’s diplomatic clout in relation to its “frozen conflict” with Armenia, which has been thawing due to joint Turkish and Armenian efforts. (21)

In light of the good vibrations flowing between Russia and Turkey, there seems to be only one thing that could put a crimp in the countries’ relationship: Nabucco, the planned natural gas pipeline whose planners --- a consortium comprising companies from Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, with possible Polish participation --- envision gas flowing from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran via Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten, Austria. In January, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov dismissed Nabucco as “ill-thought-out”; Gazprom’s CEO A. Alexander Medvedev claimed that Russia has "practically reserved the entire quantity" of Turkmenistan’s reserves, questioned whether Azerbaijan could provide its share of gas, and ruled out Iranian participation. (22)

The abundance of criticism from Russia seems to betray a genuine annoyance, if not at the pipeline itself then at the negative publicity that accompanies most mentions of the as-yet-chimerical Nabucco. In a January article in The Economist Nabucco was cited as a solution to the “real need … for Europe to reduce its [gas] dependence on Russia.” (23) Bulgaria has announced that it will cancel 1 billion cubic meters of its annual Gazprom gas purchases in favor of Nabucco gas. (24) Turkey, however, is encouraging Russian participation in Nabucco. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan acknowledged the veracity of A. Alexander Medvedev’s criticism, telling a Turkish news service, “If Russia feels itself excluded, it has instruments to hamper Nabucco. … First you have to provide the source and then find the consumer, and I think we need Russia to provide both of them.” Babacan seems to concede that if Russia were to fight for its claims to Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, it could scupper Nabucco’s chances of operating at full capacity. Turkey would have no problem with Russia’s eventual linking up to Nabucco, Babacan said, trying to dismiss the subtext of competition between the two countries. (25)

So even this one potential sticking point for Russian-Turkish foreign relations presents also the possibility for Russia to gain greater access to the European energy market. Given that Nabucco’s capacity is projected to be able to satisfy at most 10% of Europe’s annual consumption of 300 billion cubic meters --- although this is a wildly optimistic estimate based on current consumption --- Russia has little reason to be worried.

Indeed, Russia may be the only country in the world with the upper hand on Turkey at this point. Global analysts predict that Nabucco will provide Turkey’s entry into the European Union, with Germany’s most recent Minister for Economics and Technology Michael Glos going so far as to refer to the pipeline as “political blackmail.” (26) On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States will remain beholden to Turkey for the use of its Incirlik air base until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel continue apace and are more beneficial to the latter, which needs Muslim allies in the wake of the Gaza conflict. Rather than simply lying with the West, as David Phillips claims, Turkey’s future seems to lie in all directions, most notably the north.

(1) “Turkish PM walks off stage after dispute over Gaza,” Associated Press Online, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(2) “Erdogan defends decision to storm out of Davos debate,” Agence France Presse, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “Looking to the east,” International Herald Tribune, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/20/opinion/edasli.php.
(4) "Neither Turkey Nor Israel Can Give Up on Each Other," Hurriyet Daily News, 4 Feb 09 via http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=10920336&yazarid=298&tarih=2009-02-04.
(5) “Israel: Erdogan's Davos behavior may ruin Turkey's EU chances,” Haaretz, 1 Feb o9 via http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1060369.html.
(6) “Turkey's strained ties to the West,” The Boston Globe, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/02/20/turkeys_strained_ties_to_the_west/
(7) “Remarks by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Turkish President Abdullah Gul Following the Russian-Turkish Talks (as Released by the Kremlin); Location: The Kremlin, Moscow,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) CIA Factbook entry for Turkey, via https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
(11) “Remarks by Russian President … ,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09. Gul may also have been referring to what Turkey believed to be inordinately strict Russian customs controls on Turkish goods. See “Trouble Continues at Russian Customs,” Turkish Daily News, 5 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; and The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(12) “Russian Federation To Make $60 Bln of Power Supplies To Turkey For 15 Years,” ITAR-TASS, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(13) “Russian-led consortium revises bid for Turkey nuclear plant: minister,” Agence France Presse, 19 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “Russia, Turkey close to reaching agreement on building four nuclear plant units: Russian energy minister,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Russia, Turkey Close to Mega Energy Deals,” Turkish Daily News, 14 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(16) “Russia, Turkey close … ,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09.
(17) “Russia: Turkey, Tatar Republic Sign Investment Agreements,” Anatolia, 15 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(18) Ibid.
(19) “Russia, Turkey sign declarations on multifaceted cooperation,” Interfax, 16 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(20) The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(21) News reports had also credited Turkey with participating in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process (“Azerbaijan, Armenia Said To Partially Agree on Turkey-Led Nagorno-Karabakh Plan,” Hurriyet Daily News, 11 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection), but Armenia denied this (“Armenia denies negotiating with Turkey on Nagorno-Karabakh,” Russia & CIS General Newswire, 11 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe).
(22) “OSC Report: Russia, Regional States -- Diverse Commentary on Nabucco Summit,” 6 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Nabucco ‘no rival’ to Russia-backed gas pipeline project – Gazprom deputy chief,” BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, 30 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(23) “Gas wars; Energy in the European Union,” The Economist, 10 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(24) “OSC Report,” 6 Feb 09.
(25) "Turkey Wants Russia to Take Place in Nabucco, Foreign Minister," Anatolia, 20 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(26) “German Minister: Turkey Blackmailing EU Over Gas Pipe,” Agence France Presse, 20 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)