[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 26 March 2009.]
In September 2008, then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney was unhappy with Russia and Syria. "Russian arms-dealing has endangered the prospects for peace and freedom in [the Middle East],” Cheney told reporters at a political-economic summit in Cernobbio, Italy. Cheney fingered Russia as a primary source of weapons that are eventually funneled by Syria and Iran to Hizballah, and then continued, “This chain of aggressive moves and diplomatic reversals has only intensified the concern that many have about Russia's larger objectives.” (1)
Although he was not specific, Cheney was likely provoked by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s late-August weapons-shopping trip to the Russian presidential residence in Sochi, where he met with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Dmitri Medvedev. As it does with Iran, Russia maintained that it would sell to Damascus only defensive weapons. (2)
However, for Syria, the ensuing six months have culminated in vastly different rhetoric from the new administration in Washington. With the expressed intent of isolating Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this month sent her acting assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and National Security Council official Daniel Shapiro to Damascus to hold talks with high-level Syrian government representatives. For her part, Clinton spoke briefly with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam on the sidelines of a conference in Egypt on March 2, and met Lavrov in Switzerland on March 5. Even Syria’s most bitter antagonists in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are softening their approach, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal declaring a few weeks ago, “We have dug a deep pit and buried our differences and will not return to past disputes but will look forward to the future.” (3)
In light of the present bounty of guarded optimism from Syria’s past adversaries, Russia has had little to say. It quietly maintains the patron-client relationship it has held with Syria, off and on, since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1980. Although the relationship deteriorated during the Gorbachev era as Russia normalized relations with Israel, Russia and Syria have steadily resumed cooperation in the intervening years.
As is the case with Iran, Russia appears to be the most important, but not the only, supplier of weapons to Syria; however, while Iran has purchased hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Russian military technology, Syria’s purchases are much more meager and are likely based on credit. (4) Another option is for Syria to compensate Russia with naval basing rights. In late January 2009, a flurry of reports emanated from Russian news agencies, claiming that Russia would set up a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus; in the following days, a Russian naval spokesman disputed the reports, saying that they were inaccurate and did not represent an “official position.” (5) Finally, a month later, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council Upper House of Parliament, Sergei Mironov, seemed to give the bases a green light, stating that Russia must protect “its national interests not only along the perimeter of its borders, but … those parts of the world where it considers important and necessary to do that. … The experience shows that the … ocean will remain the place where the interests of different states will clash. … Thus the appearance of maybe not bases but friendly ports.” (6)
Outside the military realm, Russia has been assisting Syria with its energy infrastructure. Last month, Tatneft announced the discovery of “significant” oil reserves in Syria’s eastern desert, which should help to assuage Syria’s falling oil-production volume. (7) Additionally, several Russian energy firms --- including Tatneft, NOVATEK and Stroitransgas --- are working on developing Syria’s gas natural production capabilities. On February 12, Stroitransgas announced that, over the next two years, it would account for more than half of the expected increase in Syria’s gas output, which the company expects to rise to 24 million cubic meters per day. However, considering that Syrian domestic gas need is expected to rise to 30 million cubic meters per day in the same time frame, these projects as yet do not appear to be large-scale moneymakers. (8)
Given that Syria seems to be a charity case, commentators have speculated on the intangible benefits Russia may gain from the two countries’ relationship. In an ISCIP Perspective from May 2008, U.S. Army War College Professor Stephen Blank writes, “Russian officials apparently believe that being Syria’s patron demonstrates Moscow’s relevance to the Middle East as an indispensable great power and confirms its possession of levers that could advance the peace process along with Russian political, economic, and strategic interests in the region.” However Russia may perceive the results of its relationship with Syria, in avoiding overly enthusiastic rhetoric regarding the relationship, Russia has indeed changed the way it is perceived. For example, senior Israeli government officials told the Jerusalem Post that they would prefer Russia, and not France, to host the next Middle East peace conference. "The French are trying to do everything to paint a moderate portrait of Assad … [and] creating an illusion of Syria, as if they are not reading the papers or intelligence documents," the officials said. (9)
While France’s approach to Syria may reflect on Russia as the more realistic player, the French-Syrian relationship may also threaten to reduce Russia’s role in Syria to that of simply a weapons merchant. Barring a lasting peace between Syria and Israel, it is impossible to envision any Western nation exporting arms to Syria, but French public and private enterprises would be able to fulfill virtually any other role currently fulfilled by Russia. In September 2008, France and Syria signed several agreements guaranteeing French assistance in the development of Syria’s oil, gas and transportation infrastructure. (10)
Yet, if Syria demonstrates obstructionist tendencies in the U.S.-Iran or Israel-Palestine dialogues, or if Syria accelerates its cooperation with Hizballah, it is difficult to envision France deepening its relationship with Syria, but easy to envision France withdrawing. Therefore, what is most likely to contribute to a continuation of Russia’s current relationship with Syria may be what is least beneficial for Syria and everyone else.
(1) “Cheney: Russian arms reaching Hizbullah,” YnetNews, 06 Sept 08 via http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3592868,00.html.
(2) “Assad's shopping list,” The Jerusalem Post, 21 Aug 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “King Abdullah calls minisummit,” Arab News, 11 March 09 via http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=120159&d=11&m=3&y=2009.
(4) “Russia’s Mid-East Role,” ISCIP Perspective, 01 May 08.
(5) “Russia Said Eyeing Socotra for Basing Facility,” Vedomosti, 22 Jan 09; “Russia not planning to set up naval bases in Syria, Libya, Yemen: Navy spokesman,” Interfax, 19 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(6) “Russia must protect its interests not only along borders – speaker,” ITAR-TASS, 25 Feb 09 via Dow Jones Factiva.
(7) “Russia's Tatneft makes 'significant' Syrian oil find,” Platts Oilgram News, 4 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(8) “Stroitransgas Plans Syria Gas Output Boost,” NEFTE Compass, 12 Feb 09 via Dow Jones Factiva.
(9) “Russia may finally get its ME summit,” The Jerusalem Post, 13 Feb 09 via http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304770149&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter.
(10) “Syria, France sign agreements on oil, gas, transport cooperation,” SANA News Agency, 6 Sept 08 via BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Russia and Turkey: Relations between Equals?
[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 05 March 2009.]
Prime Minister Erdogan: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I don't think I will come back to Davos after this. (1)
Who could have predicted that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan would end up stealing the show at the Davos World Economic Forum, particularly in such a fashion? At the conclusion of a Jan. 29 panel including Erdogan, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Israeli President Shimon Peres, Erdogan took control of the floor despite objections from the moderator, denounced what he felt was an inappropriate 25-minute filibuster by Peres, and stalked off the stage. The topic, of course, had been Israel’s recently concluded siege of the Gaza Strip, which Erdogan denounced as barbaric (to be fair, he later denounced anti-Semitism as a “crime against humanity”). (2)
International media outlets seized on the episode and issued a deluge of editorials in which Erdogan’s Davos tirade represents a crucial juncture in Turkish foreign policy. Despite the flag-waving crowd of apparent patriots who welcomed Erdogan home after his premature departure from Davos, opinion in the Turkish press was not unanimous. An Istanbul-based writer for the International Herald Tribune wrote that Erdogan’s outburst signaled a “neo-Ottoman awakening,” and concluded that “some things are changing in Turkey … for good.” (3) On the other hand, a columnist for Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News cautioned that “neither Israel nor Turkey could run the risk” of “spoil[ing] their relationship.” (4)
Similar warnings appeared in Israeli and U.S. media. An unnamed Israeli official told Haaretz, "One does not risk the foreign policy of a country that claims to be a regional power for the sake of local elections," attributing Erdogan’s motivations to simple electioneering for the sake of Turkey’s upcoming electoral contests. (5) And in one of the most recent and high-profile editorials from the United States, David L. Phillips, director of the Turkey Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States, shifted the focus from Erdogan to Turkey itself, scolding: “Turkey must repair its ties with Israel. … Turkey’s future lies with the West. The Islamist street leads away from Europe to the Middle East.” (6)
And this is where Russia comes in. The opportunities provided by Turkish-Russian cooperation prove that Turkey’s choice is not binary; Turkey need not choose between either the West (i.e., the United States and Western Europe) or the Middle East. Because of its strategic location and unique cultural history, Turkey’s options are much more varied than Phillips portrays them. By cooperating with Russia and thus evading the West-versus-Middle East paradigm, Turkey opens up avenues to commerce, development and diplomacy that may never have existed had it relied only upon the West.
It is coincidental, but also providential, that Erdogan’s Davos performance would be followed so closely by Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s Feb. 12-15 official state visit to Moscow, the first of its kind by a Turkish president. Gul was enthusiastic at a joint press conference: “Our relations have already reached the level of multidimensional positive partnership on a whole range of subjects. … Russia and Turkey are the two most important countries in the region, which are called upon to make a weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, security and cooperation.” (7)
President Medvedev’s commentary was similar, but included an interesting phrase: “And these are at the moment not simply relations between equals, but are also very friendly and have very good prospects. We have recently started to call them multifaceted cooperation and multidimensional partnership.” (8)
“Not simply relations between equals.” Whatever Medvedev meant to say, there’s no disputing that right now, Turkey and Russia are not equal. One need look no further than the countries’ respective trade volumes to see that. During the state visit Medvedev pointed out that the Russia-Turkey trade volume has reached approximately $34 billion, (9) a giant leap from only $1 billion a decade ago; perhaps not wishing to embarrass his guest, Medvedev didn’t mention that this total disproportionately favors Russian exports to Turkey, which reached approximately $28.26 billion in 2008. (10) Speaking about the trade volume, Gul alluded only to “problems that exist in this area,” but then went on to express his hope that the volume will “very soon” reach $40 billion to $50 billion. (11)
Any increase in trade volume will be due in part to Russia’s accelerating participation in the development of Turkey’s energy infrastructure. During Gul’s visit, the two countries signed an agreement for Russia to supply Turkey with $60 billion of electricity over the next 15 years. (12) Additionally, Russia’s Atomstroyexport leads the only consortium to submit a bid to construct and operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, which would be located in the Mediterranean province of Mersin and have an operating capacity of 4,800 megawatts. (13) Likely because it was the sole bidder, the consortium initially tendered an offer for the plant to produce electricity at the exorbitant price of 21.16 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to the international average of 10 to 15 cents per kilowatt hour. (14) However, coinciding with Gul’s visit, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced, “We gave Turkey a good discount,” which a representative of the Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. confirmed to be a 30% reduction to 15.35 cents per kilowatt hour. (15) Shmatko also mentioned that Turkey may sign an agreement to have Russia construct four other nuclear plants of 1,200 megawatts each, and he estimated that the cost of the contract could be $18 billion to $20 billion. (16)
Turkish money has also been flowing into Muslim-majority Tatarstan, where Turkey accounts for 70% of all foreign investment. (17) The first Turkish president ever to visit the republic, Gul signed agreements for Turkish future investment worth $250 million. (18)
While Gul’s visit seems unlikely to lead to any significant recalibration of the lopsided economic relationship between the two countries, the countries are on more equal footing when it comes to regional diplomacy. Gul and Medvedev signed a declaration in which Russia praised Turkey’s proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) as a “constructive initiative which complements the existing international mechanisms and which will help eliminate the lack of trust between the countries involved in frozen conflicts.” (19)
The significance of this statement is twofold. First, Russia’s recognition of Turkey’s dominant role vis-à-vis the CSCP seems to dismiss any lingering suggestions of ill will between the countries regarding Turkey’s behavior during the 2008 South Ossetia conflict, as a direct result of which Turkey initially proposed the CSCP. There had been allegations that Russia was displeased with Turkey’s allowing U.S. warships bearing humanitarian aid into the Black Sea during the conflict. (20) Second, Russia is acknowledging Turkey’s diplomatic clout in relation to its “frozen conflict” with Armenia, which has been thawing due to joint Turkish and Armenian efforts. (21)
In light of the good vibrations flowing between Russia and Turkey, there seems to be only one thing that could put a crimp in the countries’ relationship: Nabucco, the planned natural gas pipeline whose planners --- a consortium comprising companies from Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, with possible Polish participation --- envision gas flowing from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran via Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten, Austria. In January, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov dismissed Nabucco as “ill-thought-out”; Gazprom’s CEO A. Alexander Medvedev claimed that Russia has "practically reserved the entire quantity" of Turkmenistan’s reserves, questioned whether Azerbaijan could provide its share of gas, and ruled out Iranian participation. (22)
The abundance of criticism from Russia seems to betray a genuine annoyance, if not at the pipeline itself then at the negative publicity that accompanies most mentions of the as-yet-chimerical Nabucco. In a January article in The Economist Nabucco was cited as a solution to the “real need … for Europe to reduce its [gas] dependence on Russia.” (23) Bulgaria has announced that it will cancel 1 billion cubic meters of its annual Gazprom gas purchases in favor of Nabucco gas. (24) Turkey, however, is encouraging Russian participation in Nabucco. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan acknowledged the veracity of A. Alexander Medvedev’s criticism, telling a Turkish news service, “If Russia feels itself excluded, it has instruments to hamper Nabucco. … First you have to provide the source and then find the consumer, and I think we need Russia to provide both of them.” Babacan seems to concede that if Russia were to fight for its claims to Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, it could scupper Nabucco’s chances of operating at full capacity. Turkey would have no problem with Russia’s eventual linking up to Nabucco, Babacan said, trying to dismiss the subtext of competition between the two countries. (25)
So even this one potential sticking point for Russian-Turkish foreign relations presents also the possibility for Russia to gain greater access to the European energy market. Given that Nabucco’s capacity is projected to be able to satisfy at most 10% of Europe’s annual consumption of 300 billion cubic meters --- although this is a wildly optimistic estimate based on current consumption --- Russia has little reason to be worried.
Indeed, Russia may be the only country in the world with the upper hand on Turkey at this point. Global analysts predict that Nabucco will provide Turkey’s entry into the European Union, with Germany’s most recent Minister for Economics and Technology Michael Glos going so far as to refer to the pipeline as “political blackmail.” (26) On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States will remain beholden to Turkey for the use of its Incirlik air base until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel continue apace and are more beneficial to the latter, which needs Muslim allies in the wake of the Gaza conflict. Rather than simply lying with the West, as David Phillips claims, Turkey’s future seems to lie in all directions, most notably the north.
(1) “Turkish PM walks off stage after dispute over Gaza,” Associated Press Online, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(2) “Erdogan defends decision to storm out of Davos debate,” Agence France Presse, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “Looking to the east,” International Herald Tribune, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/20/opinion/edasli.php.
(4) "Neither Turkey Nor Israel Can Give Up on Each Other," Hurriyet Daily News, 4 Feb 09 via http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=10920336&yazarid=298&tarih=2009-02-04.
(5) “Israel: Erdogan's Davos behavior may ruin Turkey's EU chances,” Haaretz, 1 Feb o9 via http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1060369.html.
(6) “Turkey's strained ties to the West,” The Boston Globe, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/02/20/turkeys_strained_ties_to_the_west/
(7) “Remarks by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Turkish President Abdullah Gul Following the Russian-Turkish Talks (as Released by the Kremlin); Location: The Kremlin, Moscow,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) CIA Factbook entry for Turkey, via https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
(11) “Remarks by Russian President … ,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09. Gul may also have been referring to what Turkey believed to be inordinately strict Russian customs controls on Turkish goods. See “Trouble Continues at Russian Customs,” Turkish Daily News, 5 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; and The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(12) “Russian Federation To Make $60 Bln of Power Supplies To Turkey For 15 Years,” ITAR-TASS, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(13) “Russian-led consortium revises bid for Turkey nuclear plant: minister,” Agence France Presse, 19 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “Russia, Turkey close to reaching agreement on building four nuclear plant units: Russian energy minister,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Russia, Turkey Close to Mega Energy Deals,” Turkish Daily News, 14 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(16) “Russia, Turkey close … ,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09.
(17) “Russia: Turkey, Tatar Republic Sign Investment Agreements,” Anatolia, 15 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(18) Ibid.
(19) “Russia, Turkey sign declarations on multifaceted cooperation,” Interfax, 16 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(20) The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(21) News reports had also credited Turkey with participating in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process (“Azerbaijan, Armenia Said To Partially Agree on Turkey-Led Nagorno-Karabakh Plan,” Hurriyet Daily News, 11 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection), but Armenia denied this (“Armenia denies negotiating with Turkey on Nagorno-Karabakh,” Russia & CIS General Newswire, 11 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe).
(22) “OSC Report: Russia, Regional States -- Diverse Commentary on Nabucco Summit,” 6 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Nabucco ‘no rival’ to Russia-backed gas pipeline project – Gazprom deputy chief,” BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, 30 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(23) “Gas wars; Energy in the European Union,” The Economist, 10 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(24) “OSC Report,” 6 Feb 09.
(25) "Turkey Wants Russia to Take Place in Nabucco, Foreign Minister," Anatolia, 20 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(26) “German Minister: Turkey Blackmailing EU Over Gas Pipe,” Agence France Presse, 20 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)
Prime Minister Erdogan: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I don't think I will come back to Davos after this. (1)
Who could have predicted that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan would end up stealing the show at the Davos World Economic Forum, particularly in such a fashion? At the conclusion of a Jan. 29 panel including Erdogan, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Israeli President Shimon Peres, Erdogan took control of the floor despite objections from the moderator, denounced what he felt was an inappropriate 25-minute filibuster by Peres, and stalked off the stage. The topic, of course, had been Israel’s recently concluded siege of the Gaza Strip, which Erdogan denounced as barbaric (to be fair, he later denounced anti-Semitism as a “crime against humanity”). (2)
International media outlets seized on the episode and issued a deluge of editorials in which Erdogan’s Davos tirade represents a crucial juncture in Turkish foreign policy. Despite the flag-waving crowd of apparent patriots who welcomed Erdogan home after his premature departure from Davos, opinion in the Turkish press was not unanimous. An Istanbul-based writer for the International Herald Tribune wrote that Erdogan’s outburst signaled a “neo-Ottoman awakening,” and concluded that “some things are changing in Turkey … for good.” (3) On the other hand, a columnist for Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News cautioned that “neither Israel nor Turkey could run the risk” of “spoil[ing] their relationship.” (4)
Similar warnings appeared in Israeli and U.S. media. An unnamed Israeli official told Haaretz, "One does not risk the foreign policy of a country that claims to be a regional power for the sake of local elections," attributing Erdogan’s motivations to simple electioneering for the sake of Turkey’s upcoming electoral contests. (5) And in one of the most recent and high-profile editorials from the United States, David L. Phillips, director of the Turkey Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States, shifted the focus from Erdogan to Turkey itself, scolding: “Turkey must repair its ties with Israel. … Turkey’s future lies with the West. The Islamist street leads away from Europe to the Middle East.” (6)
And this is where Russia comes in. The opportunities provided by Turkish-Russian cooperation prove that Turkey’s choice is not binary; Turkey need not choose between either the West (i.e., the United States and Western Europe) or the Middle East. Because of its strategic location and unique cultural history, Turkey’s options are much more varied than Phillips portrays them. By cooperating with Russia and thus evading the West-versus-Middle East paradigm, Turkey opens up avenues to commerce, development and diplomacy that may never have existed had it relied only upon the West.
It is coincidental, but also providential, that Erdogan’s Davos performance would be followed so closely by Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s Feb. 12-15 official state visit to Moscow, the first of its kind by a Turkish president. Gul was enthusiastic at a joint press conference: “Our relations have already reached the level of multidimensional positive partnership on a whole range of subjects. … Russia and Turkey are the two most important countries in the region, which are called upon to make a weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, security and cooperation.” (7)
President Medvedev’s commentary was similar, but included an interesting phrase: “And these are at the moment not simply relations between equals, but are also very friendly and have very good prospects. We have recently started to call them multifaceted cooperation and multidimensional partnership.” (8)
“Not simply relations between equals.” Whatever Medvedev meant to say, there’s no disputing that right now, Turkey and Russia are not equal. One need look no further than the countries’ respective trade volumes to see that. During the state visit Medvedev pointed out that the Russia-Turkey trade volume has reached approximately $34 billion, (9) a giant leap from only $1 billion a decade ago; perhaps not wishing to embarrass his guest, Medvedev didn’t mention that this total disproportionately favors Russian exports to Turkey, which reached approximately $28.26 billion in 2008. (10) Speaking about the trade volume, Gul alluded only to “problems that exist in this area,” but then went on to express his hope that the volume will “very soon” reach $40 billion to $50 billion. (11)
Any increase in trade volume will be due in part to Russia’s accelerating participation in the development of Turkey’s energy infrastructure. During Gul’s visit, the two countries signed an agreement for Russia to supply Turkey with $60 billion of electricity over the next 15 years. (12) Additionally, Russia’s Atomstroyexport leads the only consortium to submit a bid to construct and operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, which would be located in the Mediterranean province of Mersin and have an operating capacity of 4,800 megawatts. (13) Likely because it was the sole bidder, the consortium initially tendered an offer for the plant to produce electricity at the exorbitant price of 21.16 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to the international average of 10 to 15 cents per kilowatt hour. (14) However, coinciding with Gul’s visit, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced, “We gave Turkey a good discount,” which a representative of the Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. confirmed to be a 30% reduction to 15.35 cents per kilowatt hour. (15) Shmatko also mentioned that Turkey may sign an agreement to have Russia construct four other nuclear plants of 1,200 megawatts each, and he estimated that the cost of the contract could be $18 billion to $20 billion. (16)
Turkish money has also been flowing into Muslim-majority Tatarstan, where Turkey accounts for 70% of all foreign investment. (17) The first Turkish president ever to visit the republic, Gul signed agreements for Turkish future investment worth $250 million. (18)
While Gul’s visit seems unlikely to lead to any significant recalibration of the lopsided economic relationship between the two countries, the countries are on more equal footing when it comes to regional diplomacy. Gul and Medvedev signed a declaration in which Russia praised Turkey’s proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) as a “constructive initiative which complements the existing international mechanisms and which will help eliminate the lack of trust between the countries involved in frozen conflicts.” (19)
The significance of this statement is twofold. First, Russia’s recognition of Turkey’s dominant role vis-à-vis the CSCP seems to dismiss any lingering suggestions of ill will between the countries regarding Turkey’s behavior during the 2008 South Ossetia conflict, as a direct result of which Turkey initially proposed the CSCP. There had been allegations that Russia was displeased with Turkey’s allowing U.S. warships bearing humanitarian aid into the Black Sea during the conflict. (20) Second, Russia is acknowledging Turkey’s diplomatic clout in relation to its “frozen conflict” with Armenia, which has been thawing due to joint Turkish and Armenian efforts. (21)
In light of the good vibrations flowing between Russia and Turkey, there seems to be only one thing that could put a crimp in the countries’ relationship: Nabucco, the planned natural gas pipeline whose planners --- a consortium comprising companies from Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, with possible Polish participation --- envision gas flowing from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran via Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten, Austria. In January, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov dismissed Nabucco as “ill-thought-out”; Gazprom’s CEO A. Alexander Medvedev claimed that Russia has "practically reserved the entire quantity" of Turkmenistan’s reserves, questioned whether Azerbaijan could provide its share of gas, and ruled out Iranian participation. (22)
The abundance of criticism from Russia seems to betray a genuine annoyance, if not at the pipeline itself then at the negative publicity that accompanies most mentions of the as-yet-chimerical Nabucco. In a January article in The Economist Nabucco was cited as a solution to the “real need … for Europe to reduce its [gas] dependence on Russia.” (23) Bulgaria has announced that it will cancel 1 billion cubic meters of its annual Gazprom gas purchases in favor of Nabucco gas. (24) Turkey, however, is encouraging Russian participation in Nabucco. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan acknowledged the veracity of A. Alexander Medvedev’s criticism, telling a Turkish news service, “If Russia feels itself excluded, it has instruments to hamper Nabucco. … First you have to provide the source and then find the consumer, and I think we need Russia to provide both of them.” Babacan seems to concede that if Russia were to fight for its claims to Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, it could scupper Nabucco’s chances of operating at full capacity. Turkey would have no problem with Russia’s eventual linking up to Nabucco, Babacan said, trying to dismiss the subtext of competition between the two countries. (25)
So even this one potential sticking point for Russian-Turkish foreign relations presents also the possibility for Russia to gain greater access to the European energy market. Given that Nabucco’s capacity is projected to be able to satisfy at most 10% of Europe’s annual consumption of 300 billion cubic meters --- although this is a wildly optimistic estimate based on current consumption --- Russia has little reason to be worried.
Indeed, Russia may be the only country in the world with the upper hand on Turkey at this point. Global analysts predict that Nabucco will provide Turkey’s entry into the European Union, with Germany’s most recent Minister for Economics and Technology Michael Glos going so far as to refer to the pipeline as “political blackmail.” (26) On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States will remain beholden to Turkey for the use of its Incirlik air base until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel continue apace and are more beneficial to the latter, which needs Muslim allies in the wake of the Gaza conflict. Rather than simply lying with the West, as David Phillips claims, Turkey’s future seems to lie in all directions, most notably the north.
(1) “Turkish PM walks off stage after dispute over Gaza,” Associated Press Online, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(2) “Erdogan defends decision to storm out of Davos debate,” Agence France Presse, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “Looking to the east,” International Herald Tribune, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/20/opinion/edasli.php.
(4) "Neither Turkey Nor Israel Can Give Up on Each Other," Hurriyet Daily News, 4 Feb 09 via http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=10920336&yazarid=298&tarih=2009-02-04.
(5) “Israel: Erdogan's Davos behavior may ruin Turkey's EU chances,” Haaretz, 1 Feb o9 via http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1060369.html.
(6) “Turkey's strained ties to the West,” The Boston Globe, 20 Feb 09 via http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/02/20/turkeys_strained_ties_to_the_west/
(7) “Remarks by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Turkish President Abdullah Gul Following the Russian-Turkish Talks (as Released by the Kremlin); Location: The Kremlin, Moscow,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) CIA Factbook entry for Turkey, via https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
(11) “Remarks by Russian President … ,” Federal News Service, 13 Feb 09. Gul may also have been referring to what Turkey believed to be inordinately strict Russian customs controls on Turkish goods. See “Trouble Continues at Russian Customs,” Turkish Daily News, 5 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; and The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(12) “Russian Federation To Make $60 Bln of Power Supplies To Turkey For 15 Years,” ITAR-TASS, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(13) “Russian-led consortium revises bid for Turkey nuclear plant: minister,” Agence France Presse, 19 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(14) Ibid.
(15) “Russia, Turkey close to reaching agreement on building four nuclear plant units: Russian energy minister,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Russia, Turkey Close to Mega Energy Deals,” Turkish Daily News, 14 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(16) “Russia, Turkey close … ,” Interfax, 13 Feb 09.
(17) “Russia: Turkey, Tatar Republic Sign Investment Agreements,” Anatolia, 15 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(18) Ibid.
(19) “Russia, Turkey sign declarations on multifaceted cooperation,” Interfax, 16 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(20) The ISCIP Analyst, 18 Sept 08.
(21) News reports had also credited Turkey with participating in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process (“Azerbaijan, Armenia Said To Partially Agree on Turkey-Led Nagorno-Karabakh Plan,” Hurriyet Daily News, 11 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection), but Armenia denied this (“Armenia denies negotiating with Turkey on Nagorno-Karabakh,” Russia & CIS General Newswire, 11 Feb 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe).
(22) “OSC Report: Russia, Regional States -- Diverse Commentary on Nabucco Summit,” 6 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. “Nabucco ‘no rival’ to Russia-backed gas pipeline project – Gazprom deputy chief,” BBC Monitoring Europe - Political, 30 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(23) “Gas wars; Energy in the European Union,” The Economist, 10 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(24) “OSC Report,” 6 Feb 09.
(25) "Turkey Wants Russia to Take Place in Nabucco, Foreign Minister," Anatolia, 20 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(26) “German Minister: Turkey Blackmailing EU Over Gas Pipe,” Agence France Presse, 20 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)
Russia and Iran: Cooperation and Competition
[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 19 Feb 2009.]
Despite being fewer than two months into the year, Iran has already commemorated two major milestones in 2009. From late January to early February, 10 days of nationwide national celebration marked the 30th anniversary of the country’s Islamic revolution. In the midst of these celebrations, on Feb. 2 Iran launched into space its first domestically produced satellite, Omid (the Farsi word for hope), on the back of its Safir-2 (ambassador-2 or messenger-2) rocket.
These achievements will not alter Iran’s status as the world’s most notorious pariah state, but the underlying implications --- the entrenchment and stability of Islamic rule and the capacity for technological innovation despite sanctions --- point to a changing regional and international role for the country. The Iranian presidential elections in June 2009 will accelerate the pace of change.
Iranian-Russian foreign relations have been important for both parties, particularly during the second half of the Islamic republic’s existence: Russian exports, especially nuclear technology and weapons, have put Iran near the technological forefront of the Middle East despite sanctions; and Iranian reactions to Russian policy toward Muslim state and nonstate entities have demonstrated that Iran’s foreign policy can be more nuanced than knee-jerk radical rhetoric. Given recent and forthcoming events in Iran, though, an examination and reevaluation of the countries’ mutual policies is in order, as forthcoming events in Iran may provide it new opportunities for expanded international relations.
Certainly the most high-profile example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Although Iran began the plant’s construction in 1975 with the aid of Germany-based Siemens AG, work ceased following the Islamic revolution in 1979, only to be recommenced with the aid of Russia’s Atomstroyexport in 1995. The two countries signed an agreement of nuclear cooperation in 1992, with the Bushehr plant originally scheduled to have been completed by 1999. Throughout the early weeks of 2009, Russian and Iranian news agencies have published a flurry of articles citing officials from both countries, including Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko (1), voicing their commitment to completing the facility this year. In hopes of meeting its most recent deadline, Atomstroyexport has expanded its number of experts in Iran from 1,000 to 1,800. (2)
There is reason to question whether Atomstroyexport’s increased effort will allow construction to meet its latest deadline. Bushehr’s 30-plus-year history is rife with unfulfilled promises from Iran and her nuclear collaborators, of which Russia is one of many, albeit the most important. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mahmoud-Reza Sajjadi himself recently griped about unnamed “other countries” who had not timely met their commitments to provide construction material for the plant. (3) Considering the Bushehr facility’s multitude of literal and figurative working parts that remain out of commission, the facility at this point primarily plays a symbolic role, emphasizing Iran’s capacity to advance technologically despite sanctions and its possible future as an oil-rich country working to shed its own dependence on carbon-based energy.
Of course, Bushehr also symbolizes fears of a nuclear-armed Iran, the “apocalyptic dangers” of which scandalize the writers of U.S. and Israeli editorial pages, but which have also prompted America to propose building a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. (4) Yet, Bushehr may never evolve into anything other than what it purports to be (i.e., a warhead). Russia’s former foreign minister and national security adviser, Igor Ivanov, in April 2008 told the Jerusalem Post, “I don't think [Iran’s] political leadership is so stupid” as to attack Israel, and continued, "If all our experts left Iran tomorrow Bushehr would simply close down. ... Sometimes public opinion does not understand, thinking that we are helping Iran in some way to create military nuclear programs. This is not true." (5) If Ivanov is to be believed, it seems that Russian-Iranian cooperation on this very important front will continue for some time.
Doubts about the civilian capacity of Bushehr stem in part from Iran’s appetite for Russian military exports, which average hundreds of millions of dollars annually. (6) In 2005 Russia inked a $700 million deal to deliver to Iran 30 Tor-M1 short-range missile defense systems (7), and in December of last year Iranian defense officials boasted that they had begun receiving deliveries of Russian S-300 medium-range missile defense systems, although Russia denied the claim. (8) The S-300 system’s longer range allows it to be classified as more than simply a defensive system; and although news reports vary as to the specific type of S-300 that Russia may or may not be selling to Iran, the most advanced S-300 system would thwart any Israeli air attack on Iran until at least 2011, at which point the Israeli air force will have received delivery of the Lockheed Martin F-35, which can circumvent the S-300’s advanced radar. (9) In December 2008, Israel’s Foreign Minister Yigal Palmor told the Associated Press that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had received assurances from Russia that the latter would not do anything to jeopardize Israel’s security. (10) As of publication in mid-February 2009, news reports are inconclusive as to whether the S-300 sales have happened or even will happen.
The only other major military exporter doing comparable business in Iran is China, which has supplied Iran with a variety of missile technology. However, in recent years Russian arms exports to Iran have trumped Chinese exports by a vast margin: From 2002 to 2005, Russian arms exports to Iran totaled $1.7 billion, while Chinese arms exports to Iran totaled only $300 million. (11) Thus, although China supplies the greatest percentage of Iran’s total imports, estimated at 15% of $67.79 billion annually (compared to Russia’s 5.7% of the total), the Iranian arms market is of greater importance to Russia, and it is in Russia’s interest to continue to satisfy Iran. (12) This may explain why Russia has continued to drag its feet on the S-300 issue; Russia may not want to disappoint an important client, but it may be taking extra time to evaluate the potential diplomatic fallout in the wake of the deal. More conclusive answers may emerge after Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar’s Feb. 16 visit to Moscow. (13)
The two countries also enjoy trade of a more innocuous nature. In late January of this year, a state-run television station in the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan reported on the provincial governor’s visit to Tatarstan, where a variety of automotive and agricultural trade agreements were signed. (14) Additionally, Iran has expressed at the national level an interest in increased Russian agricultural imports. (15)
Of course, given that Russia and Iran hold the world’s largest and second-largest natural gas reserves, respectively, and considering Russia’s recent gas row with Ukraine in light of general global energy anxiety, it should come as no surprise that Russia and Iran plan to cooperate in the energy trade. The countries have mooted plans to form a gas cooperative in the model of OPEC, with Qatar mentioned as a possible additional ally. (16) Iran has also proposed that Russia act as the prime mover in setting up a Central-South Asian power grid. (17) Finally, Russia and Iran are seeking to formalize a gas-swapping deal by which either country may export gas for the other in exchange for a delivery of the same amount of gas. (18) Similar proxy-selling of petroleum has in the past benefited Iran, allowing it find possible buyers even in its own adversaries. (19) In any case, Iran’s Fars News Agency is keen to point out that foreign investment in the Iranian oil and gas sectors is not substantively hampered by sanctions against the Islamic republic. (20)
The monetary benefits of Russia’s catering to an under-served, emerging market are obvious, but Russia’s cooperation with the Islamic pariah state has garnered diplomatic benefits as well, namely Iranian temperance when it comes to conflicts involving Muslim entities. Iran’s overbearing pride in its own religious revolution colors the prism through which it views its more secular Muslim neighbors, and the country’s various efforts to invoke Islamic insurgency throughout the Muslim world have formed a primary pillar of its foreign policy, as has been evident in Lebanon, Iraq and Pakistan. Therefore, Iran’s assertion that the Chechen Wars were Russia’s “internal matter” (21) is surprising. Furthermore, during the Tajikistan civil war, Iran favored diplomacy rather than its typical fiery Islamic rhetoric, which one analyst attributes to Russian influence. (22)
Indeed it seems that there is little evidence that Russia’s and Iran’s mutually beneficial relationship will cease to exist in the near term. However, the character of the relationship is subject to change by three primary factors, the most prominent of which is the presidential election scheduled for June 12, 2009. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who served as president from 1997 to 2005, announced on Feb. 9 his candidacy for re-election, pitting him against current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and possibly other candidates. Khatami is perceived outside Iran as more liberal than Ahmadinejad, who has risen to international fame as a Holocaust denier but who is known in Iran for policies that had engendered a 30% inflation rate as recently as September 2008. Khatami, on the other hand, favors a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and has attacked both Ahmadinejad’s inflationary policies and his anti-Semitism; this, in addition to Khatami’s honorary degrees from European universities, makes him a much more attractive leader from a Western perspective. If Khatami were re-elected, Russia would no doubt find itself competing for Iran’s attention, particularly if sanctions against Iran were lifted.
In a different twist, Russia may find itself competing against Iran in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where Iran has invested in energy-generation infrastructure. As noted in The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XIV No. 10, Iran is financing two hydropower stations in Tajikistan, and Tajik government dissatisfaction with Russia may lead to further opportunities for Iranian investment. (23) In turn, Tajikistan has pledged to support Iran’s effort to become a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to which Iran currently enjoys only observer status. (24) Russia and China do not favor Iran’s entry to the group. (25)
Finally, there is the issue of basic demographics. Iran’s population is significantly younger than Russia’s, with the former’s median age at 26.4 years, compared to the latter’s median age of 38.3 years. A recent Swiss envoy to Iran predicts that Iran’s Islamic regime will outlast the “political time frame” of Iran’s most prominent detractors, which would guarantee that many generations of Iranians will come of age under a relatively stable government. (26) If Iran is able to reverse its economic course and better use its vast oil wealth, it is likely that it will return to its role as the “fulcrum in the Gulf” and additionally play a stronger role in Central Asia. (27)
(1) “Russia Says Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant To Be Launched on Schedule,” ITAR-TASS, 5 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(2) “Russia Determined To Complete Iran N. Power Plant,” Fars News Agency, 14 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(3) “Russia Set To Complete Iran's N. Power Plant In 2009,” Fars News Agency, 16 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(4) “What we meant to say was...,” The Jerusalem Post, 15 Feb 08.
(5) “Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the 'Post': 'Iran's leaders are not so stupid as to think they can destroy Israel,'” The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 08.
(6) “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,” Congressional Research Service, 23 Oct 06.
(7) “Kremlin steps up new Cold War threat with military sales to anti-U.S. regimes,” The Times (London), 19 Sept 08.
(8) “Russia Denies Selling Missile System to Iran,” The New York Times, 23 Dec 08.
(9) “Swords and Shields: F-35s vs. S-300s,” UPI, 20 Jan 09.
(10) “Russia giving Iran only defensive weapons,” Associated Press Worldstream, 22 Dec 08.
(11) “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,” Congressional Research Service, 23 Oct 06.
(12) Respective CIA Factbook entries for Russia and Iran, via https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ir.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
(13) “Iran defence minister to visit Russia on 16 Feb,” Mehr News Agency, 14 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) “Iranian Provincial Governor Reports on Visit to Russia's Tatarstan,” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran East Azarbayjan provincial TV, 23 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(15) “Iran interested in importing more grain from Russia – diplomat,” Interfax, 21 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(16) “Iran To Discuss Gas Swaps With Russia, Qatar,” Fars News Agency, 11 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(17) “Iran floats idea of Central Asia power grid with Moscow,” Interfax, 6 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(18) “Iran To Discuss Gas Swaps With Russia, Qatar,” Fars News Agency, 11 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(19) “Is Israel indirectly buying Iranian oil?” The Jerusalem Post, 12 June 08.
(20) “Iran, Russia Agree To Swap Gas,” Fars News Agency, 10 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(21) “Moslems, Orthodox Find Common Foe,” The Moscow Times, 08 June 99.
(22) "'Shiite Crescent' Might Not Be What It Seems." The Baltimore Sun, 25 April 07.
(23) The ISCIP Analyst, 27 March 08.
(24) “Foreign minister praises Iran's ties with Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 3 Dec 08; BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
(25) “Iran: Russia, China Unlikely To Welcome Tehran Into SCO,” Radio Free Europe, 30 March 08.
(26) “Washington's man in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 9 Feb 09.
(27) “Former CIA Official on Gitmo, Iraqi Elections and Iran Policy,” Harper’s online, via http://harpers.org/archive/2009/02/hbc-90004376.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)
Despite being fewer than two months into the year, Iran has already commemorated two major milestones in 2009. From late January to early February, 10 days of nationwide national celebration marked the 30th anniversary of the country’s Islamic revolution. In the midst of these celebrations, on Feb. 2 Iran launched into space its first domestically produced satellite, Omid (the Farsi word for hope), on the back of its Safir-2 (ambassador-2 or messenger-2) rocket.
These achievements will not alter Iran’s status as the world’s most notorious pariah state, but the underlying implications --- the entrenchment and stability of Islamic rule and the capacity for technological innovation despite sanctions --- point to a changing regional and international role for the country. The Iranian presidential elections in June 2009 will accelerate the pace of change.
Iranian-Russian foreign relations have been important for both parties, particularly during the second half of the Islamic republic’s existence: Russian exports, especially nuclear technology and weapons, have put Iran near the technological forefront of the Middle East despite sanctions; and Iranian reactions to Russian policy toward Muslim state and nonstate entities have demonstrated that Iran’s foreign policy can be more nuanced than knee-jerk radical rhetoric. Given recent and forthcoming events in Iran, though, an examination and reevaluation of the countries’ mutual policies is in order, as forthcoming events in Iran may provide it new opportunities for expanded international relations.
Certainly the most high-profile example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Although Iran began the plant’s construction in 1975 with the aid of Germany-based Siemens AG, work ceased following the Islamic revolution in 1979, only to be recommenced with the aid of Russia’s Atomstroyexport in 1995. The two countries signed an agreement of nuclear cooperation in 1992, with the Bushehr plant originally scheduled to have been completed by 1999. Throughout the early weeks of 2009, Russian and Iranian news agencies have published a flurry of articles citing officials from both countries, including Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko (1), voicing their commitment to completing the facility this year. In hopes of meeting its most recent deadline, Atomstroyexport has expanded its number of experts in Iran from 1,000 to 1,800. (2)
There is reason to question whether Atomstroyexport’s increased effort will allow construction to meet its latest deadline. Bushehr’s 30-plus-year history is rife with unfulfilled promises from Iran and her nuclear collaborators, of which Russia is one of many, albeit the most important. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mahmoud-Reza Sajjadi himself recently griped about unnamed “other countries” who had not timely met their commitments to provide construction material for the plant. (3) Considering the Bushehr facility’s multitude of literal and figurative working parts that remain out of commission, the facility at this point primarily plays a symbolic role, emphasizing Iran’s capacity to advance technologically despite sanctions and its possible future as an oil-rich country working to shed its own dependence on carbon-based energy.
Of course, Bushehr also symbolizes fears of a nuclear-armed Iran, the “apocalyptic dangers” of which scandalize the writers of U.S. and Israeli editorial pages, but which have also prompted America to propose building a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. (4) Yet, Bushehr may never evolve into anything other than what it purports to be (i.e., a warhead). Russia’s former foreign minister and national security adviser, Igor Ivanov, in April 2008 told the Jerusalem Post, “I don't think [Iran’s] political leadership is so stupid” as to attack Israel, and continued, "If all our experts left Iran tomorrow Bushehr would simply close down. ... Sometimes public opinion does not understand, thinking that we are helping Iran in some way to create military nuclear programs. This is not true." (5) If Ivanov is to be believed, it seems that Russian-Iranian cooperation on this very important front will continue for some time.
Doubts about the civilian capacity of Bushehr stem in part from Iran’s appetite for Russian military exports, which average hundreds of millions of dollars annually. (6) In 2005 Russia inked a $700 million deal to deliver to Iran 30 Tor-M1 short-range missile defense systems (7), and in December of last year Iranian defense officials boasted that they had begun receiving deliveries of Russian S-300 medium-range missile defense systems, although Russia denied the claim. (8) The S-300 system’s longer range allows it to be classified as more than simply a defensive system; and although news reports vary as to the specific type of S-300 that Russia may or may not be selling to Iran, the most advanced S-300 system would thwart any Israeli air attack on Iran until at least 2011, at which point the Israeli air force will have received delivery of the Lockheed Martin F-35, which can circumvent the S-300’s advanced radar. (9) In December 2008, Israel’s Foreign Minister Yigal Palmor told the Associated Press that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had received assurances from Russia that the latter would not do anything to jeopardize Israel’s security. (10) As of publication in mid-February 2009, news reports are inconclusive as to whether the S-300 sales have happened or even will happen.
The only other major military exporter doing comparable business in Iran is China, which has supplied Iran with a variety of missile technology. However, in recent years Russian arms exports to Iran have trumped Chinese exports by a vast margin: From 2002 to 2005, Russian arms exports to Iran totaled $1.7 billion, while Chinese arms exports to Iran totaled only $300 million. (11) Thus, although China supplies the greatest percentage of Iran’s total imports, estimated at 15% of $67.79 billion annually (compared to Russia’s 5.7% of the total), the Iranian arms market is of greater importance to Russia, and it is in Russia’s interest to continue to satisfy Iran. (12) This may explain why Russia has continued to drag its feet on the S-300 issue; Russia may not want to disappoint an important client, but it may be taking extra time to evaluate the potential diplomatic fallout in the wake of the deal. More conclusive answers may emerge after Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar’s Feb. 16 visit to Moscow. (13)
The two countries also enjoy trade of a more innocuous nature. In late January of this year, a state-run television station in the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan reported on the provincial governor’s visit to Tatarstan, where a variety of automotive and agricultural trade agreements were signed. (14) Additionally, Iran has expressed at the national level an interest in increased Russian agricultural imports. (15)
Of course, given that Russia and Iran hold the world’s largest and second-largest natural gas reserves, respectively, and considering Russia’s recent gas row with Ukraine in light of general global energy anxiety, it should come as no surprise that Russia and Iran plan to cooperate in the energy trade. The countries have mooted plans to form a gas cooperative in the model of OPEC, with Qatar mentioned as a possible additional ally. (16) Iran has also proposed that Russia act as the prime mover in setting up a Central-South Asian power grid. (17) Finally, Russia and Iran are seeking to formalize a gas-swapping deal by which either country may export gas for the other in exchange for a delivery of the same amount of gas. (18) Similar proxy-selling of petroleum has in the past benefited Iran, allowing it find possible buyers even in its own adversaries. (19) In any case, Iran’s Fars News Agency is keen to point out that foreign investment in the Iranian oil and gas sectors is not substantively hampered by sanctions against the Islamic republic. (20)
The monetary benefits of Russia’s catering to an under-served, emerging market are obvious, but Russia’s cooperation with the Islamic pariah state has garnered diplomatic benefits as well, namely Iranian temperance when it comes to conflicts involving Muslim entities. Iran’s overbearing pride in its own religious revolution colors the prism through which it views its more secular Muslim neighbors, and the country’s various efforts to invoke Islamic insurgency throughout the Muslim world have formed a primary pillar of its foreign policy, as has been evident in Lebanon, Iraq and Pakistan. Therefore, Iran’s assertion that the Chechen Wars were Russia’s “internal matter” (21) is surprising. Furthermore, during the Tajikistan civil war, Iran favored diplomacy rather than its typical fiery Islamic rhetoric, which one analyst attributes to Russian influence. (22)
Indeed it seems that there is little evidence that Russia’s and Iran’s mutually beneficial relationship will cease to exist in the near term. However, the character of the relationship is subject to change by three primary factors, the most prominent of which is the presidential election scheduled for June 12, 2009. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who served as president from 1997 to 2005, announced on Feb. 9 his candidacy for re-election, pitting him against current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and possibly other candidates. Khatami is perceived outside Iran as more liberal than Ahmadinejad, who has risen to international fame as a Holocaust denier but who is known in Iran for policies that had engendered a 30% inflation rate as recently as September 2008. Khatami, on the other hand, favors a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and has attacked both Ahmadinejad’s inflationary policies and his anti-Semitism; this, in addition to Khatami’s honorary degrees from European universities, makes him a much more attractive leader from a Western perspective. If Khatami were re-elected, Russia would no doubt find itself competing for Iran’s attention, particularly if sanctions against Iran were lifted.
In a different twist, Russia may find itself competing against Iran in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where Iran has invested in energy-generation infrastructure. As noted in The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XIV No. 10, Iran is financing two hydropower stations in Tajikistan, and Tajik government dissatisfaction with Russia may lead to further opportunities for Iranian investment. (23) In turn, Tajikistan has pledged to support Iran’s effort to become a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to which Iran currently enjoys only observer status. (24) Russia and China do not favor Iran’s entry to the group. (25)
Finally, there is the issue of basic demographics. Iran’s population is significantly younger than Russia’s, with the former’s median age at 26.4 years, compared to the latter’s median age of 38.3 years. A recent Swiss envoy to Iran predicts that Iran’s Islamic regime will outlast the “political time frame” of Iran’s most prominent detractors, which would guarantee that many generations of Iranians will come of age under a relatively stable government. (26) If Iran is able to reverse its economic course and better use its vast oil wealth, it is likely that it will return to its role as the “fulcrum in the Gulf” and additionally play a stronger role in Central Asia. (27)
(1) “Russia Says Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant To Be Launched on Schedule,” ITAR-TASS, 5 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(2) “Russia Determined To Complete Iran N. Power Plant,” Fars News Agency, 14 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(3) “Russia Set To Complete Iran's N. Power Plant In 2009,” Fars News Agency, 16 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(4) “What we meant to say was...,” The Jerusalem Post, 15 Feb 08.
(5) “Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the 'Post': 'Iran's leaders are not so stupid as to think they can destroy Israel,'” The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 08.
(6) “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,” Congressional Research Service, 23 Oct 06.
(7) “Kremlin steps up new Cold War threat with military sales to anti-U.S. regimes,” The Times (London), 19 Sept 08.
(8) “Russia Denies Selling Missile System to Iran,” The New York Times, 23 Dec 08.
(9) “Swords and Shields: F-35s vs. S-300s,” UPI, 20 Jan 09.
(10) “Russia giving Iran only defensive weapons,” Associated Press Worldstream, 22 Dec 08.
(11) “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,” Congressional Research Service, 23 Oct 06.
(12) Respective CIA Factbook entries for Russia and Iran, via https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ir.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
(13) “Iran defence minister to visit Russia on 16 Feb,” Mehr News Agency, 14 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(14) “Iranian Provincial Governor Reports on Visit to Russia's Tatarstan,” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran East Azarbayjan provincial TV, 23 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(15) “Iran interested in importing more grain from Russia – diplomat,” Interfax, 21 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(16) “Iran To Discuss Gas Swaps With Russia, Qatar,” Fars News Agency, 11 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(17) “Iran floats idea of Central Asia power grid with Moscow,” Interfax, 6 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political via Lexis-Nexis.
(18) “Iran To Discuss Gas Swaps With Russia, Qatar,” Fars News Agency, 11 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(19) “Is Israel indirectly buying Iranian oil?” The Jerusalem Post, 12 June 08.
(20) “Iran, Russia Agree To Swap Gas,” Fars News Agency, 10 Jan 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(21) “Moslems, Orthodox Find Common Foe,” The Moscow Times, 08 June 99.
(22) "'Shiite Crescent' Might Not Be What It Seems." The Baltimore Sun, 25 April 07.
(23) The ISCIP Analyst, 27 March 08.
(24) “Foreign minister praises Iran's ties with Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 3 Dec 08; BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
(25) “Iran: Russia, China Unlikely To Welcome Tehran Into SCO,” Radio Free Europe, 30 March 08.
(26) “Washington's man in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 9 Feb 09.
(27) “Former CIA Official on Gitmo, Iraqi Elections and Iran Policy,” Harper’s online, via http://harpers.org/archive/2009/02/hbc-90004376.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)
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