Russia and Iran: Ambiguity clouds Russian-Iranian missile deal

[This report was also published in an altered form in The ISCIP Analyst, a publication of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conlict, Ideology, and Policy, 16 April 2009.]

Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar was on a “missile quest,” according to Agence France Presse, when he met his Russian counterpart, Anatoly Serdyukov, in Moscow on Tuesday, February 17. (1) The missiles in question belong to Russia’s S-300 medium-range surface-to-air defense system, which Iran signed an agreement to purchase approximately two years ago and which would provide Iran the ability to fend off any assault from Israel’s air force. That Iran would still be on a “quest” to obtain the missiles despite the years-old purchase agreement is a testament to the ambiguity and mystery surrounding the affair.

Official Russian sources have downplayed the S-300 agreement, with some going so far as to disavow it completely. Last October, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko nixed the possibility of selling the S-300 system to Iran, saying, “Our high-ranking politicians have declared many times that we will not supply such weapons to countries located in what we call perturbed regions.” (2) Even after the Najjar-Serdyukov meeting, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told Interfax on March 18, “We confirm the fact that Russia is not shipping S-300s to Iran or to any other Middle East countries.” (3) Iran’s Fars New Agency reported March 26 that Konstantin Kosachev, the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee chief, said that S-300 missiles were “out of the question” for Iran. (4)

Iran, on the other hand, has never hesitated to completely contradict Russia on the subject of the S-300s. Last December, the deputy head of the Iranian Parliament's Commission for Foreign Affairs and National Security declared, “Now the S-300 system is being delivered.” (5) Najjar himself emerged from his meeting with Serdyukov boasting of “success.” (6) And on April 3, the vice president of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee told the Tehran-based Hamshahri daily, “We have talked with the Russians about this issue for several years and we have achieved good agreements that are being implemented now. This missile system will be used to reinforce the … borders and territory of Iran.” (7)

Of course, the truth of the matter seems to lie somewhere in between the two countries’ respective accounts. On March 18, an anonymous official from Russia’s Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation told ITAR-TASS, “Air defense systems S-300 were not supplied to Iran under the contract concluded two years ago. … [T]he contract is being fulfilled gradually [depending on] the current international situation and the decision of the country’s leadership.” (8)

Russian newspaper Izvestiya followed up on April 3, reporting that Russia had delivered S-300 launchers to Iran, but not the actual missiles. Izvestiya also reported that the original S-300 contract was worth $800 million, and that there is a new incentive for Russia to fulfill the contract sooner rather than later: China has just unveiled its own exact copy of the S-300, which it plans to sell for cheaper, undercutting Russia. Russian analyst Ruslan Pukhov told Izvestiya, "In view of diminishing arms exports to India and China, it would be foolhardy of us to allow ourselves also to lose the Iranian market." (9)

In light of the basic financial motive, it is likely that Russia will eventually fulfill the terms of the contract and transfer the missiles to Iran. However, as mentioned in the previous issue of The ISCIP Analyst, Russia’s arms sales to Iran have proved a contentious issue in Russian-American relations, given that Iran funnels arms to Hizballah in Lebanon. Last September, then-Vice President Dick Cheney deemed the arms sales “aggressive” on Russia’s part, (10) and there are signs that the issue has almost certainly been taken up by the Obama administration. At a press conference following his early-March meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a point of stating, “We are not violating anything in our military-technological cooperation with Iran, and at the same time we fully take into account all concerns expressed by our partners from the U.S. and Israel.” (11)

Weighing the high price of the S-300 deal against U.S. and Israeli concerns about Russian weapons winding up in the hands of Hizballah, Russia may have adopted a pro-government, pro-security stance toward Lebanon in order to shield itself from criticism when or if it finally fulfills its contract with Iran.

For example, in April 2008 Russia donated $500,000 to the U.N. trust fund for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which seeks to determine the culprit behind the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s then-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Along with its donation, Russia gave its support to “ensuring the stable and peaceful development of [Lebanon] on the basis of Lebanese national consensus and consideration for the interests of all political and ethno-confessional forces.” (12)

Presumably to further that end, Russia made another donation to Lebanon in December 2008, this time in the form of 10 MiG-29 fighter planes, which Russia has promised to modernize out of its own pocket; it will also provide a limited warranty and train Lebanese pilots to fly the planes. The reaction from the Lebanese ruling coalition, which opposes Hizballah, has been overwhelmingly positive, with Rafiq al-Hariri’s son Saad saying, “Russia gives a good example of how to deal with Lebanon's cause, and we hope that all those calling for Lebanon's independence and sovereignty would do the same.” (13) Even a subsequent report in Russia’s Kommersant stating “one-third of the MiG-29 should be written off as obsolete because they are too rusty to take off without crashing” was not enough to stop Lebanese parliament member (and famed political survivor of Lebanon’s civil war) Walid Jumblatt from flying to Moscow in late February to express his gratitude. (14)

Considering the strategic and monetary value of the S-300s, as well as Israel’s increasing vigilance toward halting weapons shipments to hostile neighbors, it is unlikely that Iran would consider funneling the missiles to its Hizballah clients. However, with its charitable approach toward Lebanon, Russia seems to be investing political capital for the future, in case a finalized sale of the S-300s leads again to accusations that it indirectly provides the tools that Hizballah uses to destabilize the region’s security. And as with its approach to neighboring Syria, in Lebanon Russia is openly wielding influence where the U.S. has for decades had trouble finding a receptive audience. Likely in response to Russia’s generosity, the U.S. will increase its military aid to Lebanon to $189.1 million from $90.7 million, if an anonymous report in the Lebanese An-Nahar daily is accurate. (15)

Regardless of the results of Russia’s arms deals with Iran, both Russia and the U.S. may be forced to reconsider their respective approaches to Lebanon following the latter country’s general elections on June 7, 2009. The Western-aligned Sunni Muslim, Christian and Druze ruling coalition that benefited from Lebanon’s so-called Cedar Revolution in 2005 has been fracturing and is not predicted to remain in power, at least in its current state. A coalition of Shiite Muslim Hizballah, Christians and leftists is predicted to fare well, in which case any dealings with Lebanon would become much trickier for all involved. In any case, given Lebanon’s perpetual status as an arena for countries to carry out hot and cold proxy wars against each other, some future Russian and U.S. presence seems likely.

(1) “Iranian defence minister in Russia on missile quest,” Agence France Presse, 17 Feb 09, via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(2) “Russia Won’t Supply S-300 Missile Systems to Iran – Ministry,” Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama, 9 Oct 08, via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(3) “Russia Denies Shipping S-300 Missiles To Mideast Countries, Including Iran,” Interfax, 18 March 09, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(4) “Russian official says Moscow not to provide S-300 missile to Iran,” Tehran Press TV, 26 March 09, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.
(5) “Russia Denies Selling Missile System to Iran,” The New York Times, 23 Dec 08, via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.
(6) “Iran defence minister says Moscow trip was success,” Press TV Tehran, 20 Feb 09, via BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit.
(7) “Delivery of S300 Missile System to Iran Started,” Hamshahri, 2 April 09, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(8) “Russia concludes contract with Iran on S-300 supply,” ITAR-TASS, 18 March 09, via http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13689099&PageNum=0.
(9) “Iran's Waiting for the Russian SAM Launchers Finally Ended; but So Far They Still Have No Missiles," Izvestiya, 3 April 09, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(10) “Cheney: Russian arms reaching Hizbullah,” YnetNews, 06 Sept 08 via http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3592868,00.html.
(11) “Russia's cooperation with Iran does not violate any agreements – Lavrov,” Interfax, 7 March 09, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(12) “Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Mikhail Kamynin Regarding the Russian Federation’s Contribution to Finance the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” 4 April 08, via http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/040408/newen1.htm.
(13) “Lebanon's supersonic solution?” The Guardian, 21 Dec 08, via http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/21/lebanon-russia.
(14) "Arab Unity Being Restored," ITAR-TASS, 2 March 09, OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.
(15) “US wants to boost military aid to Beirut – report,” Daily Star, 14 April 09, via http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=100948.
By Blake Brunner (brunner@bu.edu)